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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880406-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), following a 
jury trial held May 24-25, 1988, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 25, 1987, at approximately nine o'clock in 
the morning, the Ted John family left their home at 1162 Emery 
Avenue located in Salt Lake County for a short trip to southern Utah 
(R. 118 at 27, 39). When the John family returned home on 
September 27, 1987, somehwere around 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., they 
found a note from the police attached to their door indicating that 
their home had been burglarized. The note indicated an 
investigation had been started and requested that the Johns contact 
the police (R. 118 at 29). 
Mr. John inventoried the house for missing items and 
reported that stereo equipment valued at approximately $800 was 
missing (R. 118 at 31). Specifically, an amplifier, cassette player 
and tuner (three component parts to the system) were absent together 
with the connecting wires or "patch cords" (R. 118 at 31-32). The 
amplifier and the cassette components both measured fourteen inches 
by six inches by ten inches, with the amplifier weighing ten to 
fifteen pounds and the cassette player approximately four pounds 
(R. 118 at 43). The tuner component measured fourteen inches by 
three inches by ten inches and weighed approximately two pounds 
(R. 118 at 43-44). Mr. John later reported that a canister-type 
vacuum cleaner was also missing (R. 118 at 31). The vacuum cleaner 
was described as approximately three to four feet high and fourteen 
to eighteen inches across (R. 118 at 44). The vacuum cleaner 
together with the accompanying hose attachments was valued at 
approximately $100 (R. 118 at 31). 
Near the hour of 11:30 a.m. that Sunday morning, a 
neighbor across the street from the John dwelling was returning home 
from the grocery store (R. 118 at 57). This woman, Patricia Rains, 
testified that as she arrived home, she observed a burgandy Mazda 
pickup truck parked on the street and an individual standing on the 
porch of her neighbor's home (R. 118 at 58-59). Mrs. Rains watched 
this individual for approximately five minutes, indicating that at 
various times he knocked on the door, looked in the mail box, peeked 
through the large picture window at the front of the house, and 
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looked around (R. 118 at 59-60). Mrs. Rains testified that she 
thought he was stranded (R. 118 at 68). 
Mrs. Rains testified at trial that this man was Andrew 
Quintana (R. 118 at 61). She later clarified in her testimony that 
she did not know Mr. Quintana but knew of him, and she admitted that 
she had never met him (R. 118 at 61-62, 69-70). Yet, Mrs. Rains 
claimed to recognize him (R. 118 at 62, 68). She testified that at 
the closest, as she pulled into her driveway, she was thirty feet 
from the individual; other than that one point, she was no closer 
than one hundred feet from him (R. 118 at 72, 79). She described 
this man, in her mind Andrew Quintana, as approximately five feet, 
six inches tall, wearing bright and colorful bermuda shorts along 
with a tee shirt, the color of which she could not recall (R. 118 at 
62). After standing on the porch for several minutes, the 
individual returned to his Mazda pickup truck and drove away. 
Mrs. Rains' husband, Mr. Calvin Dean Rains, also 
testified. He described the person standing on the porch to have 
been a Mexican male in his mid-twenties, approximately five feet 
seven inches tall, with light to medium semi-wavey black hair 
(R. 118 at 87). Mr. Rains also testified that the individual was 
wearing multicolored bermuda shorts and a large tank top. As had 
his wife, Mr. Rains felt the individual on the porch of the John 
home looked "suspicious1' (R. 118 at 87). Also, as had his wife, 
Mr. Rains thought the person had left the area (R. 118 at 89). 
Mr. Rains then testified that a couple of minutes later, 
Mr. Rains went to his truck and headed back to the store for 
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additional groceries (R. 118 at 90). As he pulled out of the 
driveway and around the corner, he spotted the same vehicle parked 
directly across from an alley way which ran behind the Johns1 home 
(R. 118 at 91). Mr. Rains decided to stop and see what he could 
observe. He initially was unable to see the individual, but within 
a few moments, he saw a person come out of the alley way (R. 118 at 
92-93). He testified that the man he saw come out of the alley way 
was the same man that he saw on the porch (R. 118 at 93). He 
testified that this man initially walked toward the Mazda pickup 
truck, then spotted Mr. Rains in his vehicle and turned around 
(R. 118 at 93). After several steps, he again turned around and 
headed for the Mazda pickup truck (R. 118 at 93). Mr. Rains was 
seventy-five to eighty yards away from the individual and testified 
that it looked like this individual was carrying something under his 
shirt (R. 118 at 94). He testified there was a large bulge on the 
left-hand side and that the person was carrying his arm underneath 
it (R. 118 at 94). This person walked directly to the vehicle, 
which was some seventy-five yards away from Mr. Rains, and left the 
area (R. 118 at 94). Mr. Rains then returned to his own home and 
spoke with his wife. Police officers were called and the crime 
reported (R. 1L8 at 95-96). 
Police Officer Chris Ahearn received a dispatch summoning 
him to 1162 Emery Street on the 27th of September, 1987, at 
11:54 a.m. (R. 118 at 46-47) He spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Rains and 
received descriptions of the vehicle and the individual. The 
description given was a male Hispanic, dark hair, five feet seven 
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inches tall, approximately 130 pounds (R. 118 at 47). The vehicle 
was described as a Mazda pickup, maroon in color with trim and a 
damaged grill (R. 118 at 47). The license plate was reported as 
5600AK (R. 118 at 50). Upon investigating the John residence, 
Office Ahearn found that the back door to the home was open, there 
was damage to a side window, and the screen was torn away (R. 118 at 
47-48). Inside the home, it appeared to him that several pieces of 
stereo equipment were missing and drawers had been partially pulled 
out of a dresser (R. 118 at 48). Officer Ahearn also testified that 
it appeared that someone had walked through the weeds in the 
backyard toward the alley because the weeds were partially trampled 
(R. 118 at 49) . 
Officer Ahearn's report was given to headquarters, which 
then issued a dispatch for the suspect vehicle. Later that same day 
at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Robert Robinson of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department spotted a 1983 Mazda, maroon and trimmed 
pickup truck and pulled it over as a suspect vehicle in the burglary 
(R. 119 at 4). The license plate of that vehicle was 3600AK (not 
5600AK as reported). Officer Robinson indicated that the dispatch 
also included a suspect described as a short male Hispanic adult in 
his twenties, short black hair, wearing a tee shirt and shorts 
(R. 119 at 5). The driver of the vehicle pulled over by Officer 
Robinson was Andrew Quintana (R. 119 at 5). Officer Robinson 
informed Mr. Quintana that he would impound the truck as a suspect 
vehicle in a burglary (R. 119 at 8). He did not, however, arrest 
Mr. Quintana (R. 119 at 16). Officer Robinson noted at that time 
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that Mr. Quintana was in a blue pullover shirt with grey 
bermuda-type shorts (R. 119 at 9). He also noted that on the 
passenger seat in bhe cab of the pickup truck was wiring apparatus 
which was eventually introduced at trial as Exhibit One and 
identified as patch cords for a stereo system (R. 119 at 9). The 
police officer noted that this vehicle was stopped within three to 
four blocks of Mr. Quintana's residence and approximately five to 
six miles away from the burglary site (R. 119 at 11). Officer 
Robinson clarified that the shorts were not multicolored but were in 
fact grey, with no noticable variation in color (R. 119 at 14). He 
also noted that the shirt was not a tank top and was without emblems 
(R. 119 at 15). Officer Robinson further testified that 
Mr. Quintana had indicated that he was with this truck around Noon 
that afternoon helping his sister move a washer and dryer (R. 119 at 
17). 
At trial, Mr. Quintana's mother and sister testified. 
His mother indicated that her son does not own multicolored shorts 
(R. 119 at 26). Mr. Quintana's sister, Gerline, testified that 
Mr. Quintana assisted her with moving a washer and dryer at 
approximately 1:45 in the afternoon until a little after 2:00 p.m. 
(R. 119 at 20). She testified she believed Mr. Quintana was wearing 
grey shorts (R. 119 at 22). 
Additionally, Andrew's brother, Jack Quintana, took the 
stand, testifying that the truck in question was his and that there 
was no damage to the front grill of his truck but rather no front 
grill (R. 119 at 46). Jack Quintana further testified that the 
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patch cords introduced by the prosecution as Exhibit One belonged to 
the amplifier of his stereo system which he alternatively utilized 
in both the home and the truck (R. 119 at 42). Jack Quintana also 
testified that, as a matter of practice, he kept those patch cords 
in the truck to be used with his amplifier (R. 119 at 41-42, 
45-46). His amplifier was also introduced into evidence to support 
that testimony (R. 99). 
Thomas J. Wennergren testified for the defense, noting 
that in his stocking feet, Mr. Andrew Quintana is 5f 3-1/2" tall 
and, when wearing sneakers, 5' 4-3/4" tall (R. 119 at 49). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress 
the identification testimony of Mr. Rains because it was obtained 
through suggestive police procedures (R. 24-28, 31-35). Mr. Rains 
was informed by police officers that they had a suspect in the 
burglary crime and they brought Mr. Rains to the police station to 
see if he could identify the individual they had in custody as the 
man he had seen. Mr. Quintana was then brought out by a police 
officer and instructed to walk past Mr. Rains sitting at the desk. 
Mr. Rains agreed he was the same man (R. 27-28). The trial court 
took the motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order 
granting the motion to suppress the witness identification (R. 40). 
At trial, the prosecutor stated in his opening statements 
to the jury that Mr. Rains "saw the defendant come out" from the 
alley (R. 118 at 17). The statement drew an immediate objection 
from defense counsel and a conference was held at the bench (R. 118 
at 17). The prosecutor then continued his opening statement with 
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similar statements to the jury (R. 118 at 17-18). Defense counsel 
asked that the Court hear argument on this objection before he 
proceeded with his opening statement and the jury was excused to 
accommodate that request (R. 118 at 19). 
Counsel for Mr. Quintana then urged that the prosecutor's 
remarks—that Mr. Rains saw the defendant coming out of the alley— 
left an indelible impression in the jurors' minds that Mr. Rains 
identified Mr. Quintana as the perpetrator of the crimes; counsel 
insisted that the prosecutor's remark was in direct contradiction to 
the Court's order and moved for a mistrial on that basis (R. 118 at 
19-20). After brief argument, the trial court denied the mistrial 
motion (R. 118 at 21). 
At the conclusion of the testimony, Mr. Quintana moved to 
dismiss the case against him based on lack of evidence (R. 119 at 
50-52). The trial court denied that motion (R. 119 at 53). 
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, exceptions to 
the jury instructions were made on the record after the jury had 
retired to deliberate (R. 119 at 53, 104). Mr. Quintana objected to 
Instruction No. 19 given by the Court, asserting the instruction was 
contrary to the facts and an inaccurate statement of the law (R. 119 
at 104-05). 
After deliberating for less than two hours, the jury 
returned with a verdict of guilty of the Burglary charge (R. 119 at 
106) and this appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's opening statement constituted misconduct 
when, in direct contradiction to the trial court's order suppressing 
a witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor informed 
the jurors that the witness in question saw Mr. Quintana, thereby 
connecting in the minds of the jurors the identification evidence he 
could not legally elicit from the witness. The prosecutor's 
misconduct prejudiced Mr. Quintana and requires reversal of his 
convictions and a new trial ordered. 
Insufficient evidence was presented to justify the 
convictions for Burglary and Theft, requiring that Mr. Quintana's 
convictions be reversed and the charges against him be dismissed. 
Over the objection of counsel, the trial court gave an 
instruction to the jury which was without a factual basis and which 
relieved the State of its burden to prove each and every element of 
the crimes charged against Mr. Quintana. That instruction violated 
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights and he suffered prejudice 
requiring that his convictions be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE 
PREJUDICED MR. QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY 
FAIR TRIAL AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTIONS. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to suppress 
the identification testimony of Mr. Calvin Dean Rains (R. 24-28; see 
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Addendum A). Mr. Rains had been informed by police officers that a 
suspect in the burglary/theft case was in custody, and Mr. Rains had 
been brought down to the station to see if he could make a positive 
identification (R. 24-28, 34-35). Police sat Mr. Rains at a desk 
and then walked Mr. Quintana past him; no other suspects were walked 
in front of Mr. Rains (R. 26-28, 33-35). Mr. Quintana urged that 
the subsequent identification of him by Mr. Rains was obtained in an 
unconstitutional manner and moved the Court to suppress that 
identification testimony (R. 24-28). The trial court took the 
motion under advisement (R. 39) and later issued an order granting 
the motion to suppress the witness1 identification of Mr. Quintana 
(R. 40; see Addendum B). The order stated: 
On motion of the defendant and good cause 
appearing it is hereby ordered that the motion to 
suppress witness identification is granted. 
The Court finds that the identification 
procedure used in this case was suggestive and the 
State is prohibited from using the testimony of 
Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent proceedings to 
identify Mr. Andrew Quintana (R. 40). 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the 
jury that Mr. Rains informed the police that the burglar was this 
defendant, Andrew Quintana, and that Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the 
defendant on the porch of the John home until he left the area and 
parked down at the end of the street (R. 118 at 15-16). The 
prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains was curious to know what was 
happening because something was "not right" (R. 118 at 16). He 
stated that Mr. Rains got into his car and drove to the corner near 
the alleyway which ran behind the John home (R. 118 at 16-17). The 
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prosecutor explained that Mr. Rains parked next to that alley 
(R. 118 at 17). The prosecutor then stated: "And [Mr. Rains] said 
that the defendant was out of sight. [Mr. Rains] didn't know 
exactly where the defendant had gone but essentially he said he saw 
him come out [of the alley from behind the John home]" (R. 118 at 
17). Counsel for Mr. Quintana immediately objected and asked to 
approach the bench; a sidebar conference was then held (R. 118 at 
17). 
Returning to his opening statment, the prosecutor 
continued: 
By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, is 
sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man 
come out in the area here on the diagram, which is 
almost adjacent to where Ted John lives. And he 
said that when the man came out, he appeared to be 
wearing some kind of a baggy shirt, something like 
a large T-shirt. Appeared there was something up 
underneath that T-shirt. He said that initially 
when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for 
a minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go 
the other way. Then he turned around and came 
back down the alleyway. 
He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and 
went over and got into something inside that 1983 
Mazda pickup and took off. 
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, 
told her to call the police, and then he went over 
to Ted John's house and discovered that the back 
door was opened and went in and appeared someone 
had been in there, inside the house. He waited 
and the police eventually arrived (R. 118 at 
17-18; see complete opening statement of 
prosecutor at Addendum C). 
After the prosecutor concluded his opening statement, 
counsel for Mr. Quintana requested that the jury be excused so that 
he could make a motion before he delivered his opening statement 
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(R. 118 at 19). The Court obliged and defense counsel then moved 
for a mistrial (R. 118 at 19-21). Counsel urged that the prosecutor 
had just accomplished for Mr. Rains what the Court had ordered could 
not be done, to wit: planted in the minds of the jurors that 
Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana coming out of that alleyway (R. 118 at 
19-20; see Addendum D for mistrial motion, argument and ruling). 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating: 
THE COURT: Based on what has been argued, 
the Court is going to deny the motion. Court will 
either make a curative instruction, but I believe 
the Court has already told the jurors that the 
only evidence that they are to consider is the 
evidence that's heard form the witness stand. So 
as the evidence comes out in arguments that are 
made you will have to—that will have to be tied 
in, and I don't think it can be tied in as far as 
the evidence is concerned. 
So the motion will be denied (R. 118 at 
21) . 
Mr. Quintana insists that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, and he maintains that 
the prosecutor's remarks constitute misconduct and in and of 
themselves require that Mr. Quintana's convictions be reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial. 
Case lav/ espousing the duties and obligations of 
prosecutors is legion. Several such directives merit mentioning. 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws 
has a duty to not only secure appropriate 
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that 
justice is done. In his role as the State's 
representative in criminal matters, the 
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt to 
win cases, but must see that justice is done. 
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor, it is as much his duty to refrain from 
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improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
to bring about a just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
The purpose of an opening statement is to 
advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of 
the questions and issues involved, which the jury 
will have to determine, and to give them a general 
picture of the facts and the situations, so that 
they will be able to understand the evidence. 
Counsel should outline generally what he intends 
to prove, and should be .allowed considerable 
latitude. He should make a fair statement of the 
evidence and the extent to which he may go is 
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He 
should not make a statement of any facts which he 
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he 
argue the merits of his case, or relate the 
testimony at length. 
State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted; 
emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394, 
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein. 
[A prosecutor] may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor—indeed he should do so. 
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is . . . his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets by 
advancing in his opening statement the concept that his witness saw 
Mr. Quintana in the alley behind the John residence emerging with a 
bulge under his shirt—presumably of stolen goods. The trial court 
had ordered that Mr. Rains was prohibited from identifying 
Mr. Quintana at any subsequent proceedings because the 
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suggestiveness of the procedure used to obtain that identification 
rendered it unreliable. In advancing that the witness saw 
Mr. Quintana, the prosecutor placed in the jurors' minds the 
identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains in direct contravention 
of the Court's order. The prosecutor stated as fact something he 
knew he could not legally establish at trial. 
Because the statement violated the court order, the 
prosecutor cannot claim the error was made either unintentionally or 
somehow in good faith. An examination of United States v. Johnson, 
767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), dispells this remote possibility. In 
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals instructed that 
prosecutor misconduct "made during an opening statement makes it 
more egregious than a similar remark would be during closing 
argument." Ij3. at 1274. The Court clarified that certain 
improprieties during closing arguments can be excused as a product 
of provocation but that an opening statement does not occur in such 
a charged atmosphere and is usually presumed to be carefully 
planned. Id. 
Nor can this Court permit the misconduct to stand because 
the opening statements of counsel are not evidence—as urged by the 
prosecutor and adapted by the trial court as basis to deny the 
mistrial motion. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court, in a case where 
improper remarks of the prosecutor during opening statements were 
found to be reversible error, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1984), reiterated the standard governing reversals for improper 
statements of the prosecutor. The Court stated: 
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The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a 
criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and [2] were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 486 (citing inter alia State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(Utah 1973). 
Applying this test to Mr. Quintana'a case demonstrates 
the prosecutor's misconduct merits reversal. The first prong of the 
test is met because the prosecutor's statement called to the 
attention of the jurors a fact which had been suppressed by the 
trial court and ordered inadmissible because of the violation of 
Mr. Quintana's constitutional rights to due process and a fair 
trial. The prosecutor's statement disclosed to the jurors that, 
contrary to the court order barring the information, Mr. Rains 
identified Mr. Quintana as the man in the alley behind the John home 
with a bulge under his shirt. The jurors were not entitled to hear 
that information. 
The second prong—whether the jurors were influenced by 
that information—is equally clear. Because this case was conceded 
by all to have been an identification case (R. 83-86; R. 118 at 
19-21), the statement that Mr. Rains saw Mr. Quintana in the alley 
behind the John residence with a bulge under his shirt provided the 
jurors with an inference that the bulge might have been missing 
property which might have come from the John home. This information 
"probably influenced the jurors" because no other information came 
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as close to placing Mr. Quintana in the home, to establish the 
burglary, or in possession of property belonging to the John family, 
to establish the theft. 
Inasmuch as the standard governing reversals for improper 
statements of the prosecutor has been met, Mr. Quintana urges this 
Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor in this case to merit 
reversal of his convictions for Burglary and Theft and for this 
Court to remand his case for a new trial. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF 
MR. QUINTANA. 
Mr. Quintana maintains that the evidence adduced at trial 
is unable to support the convictions of Burglary and Theft. He 
requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence, 
reverse his convictions, and remand his case to the trial court with 
an order dismissing the charges against him. In State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[N]ot 
withstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this 
court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict." Further, the Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for 
which he was convicted. 
Id. This standard restates the due process requirement which 
prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond 
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a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which the defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307 (1979); In re Winshipy 397 U.S. 258 (1970). 
Mr. Quintana denied committing the Burglary and Theft 
charges filed against him, thereby requiring the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of those crimes. 
Mr. Quintana insists that the State did not meet that burden. The 
State must necessarily have shown that Mr. Quintana committed the 
following acts: 
76-6-202. Burglary—(1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of the building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on 
any person. 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements—A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with the purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-404 (1953 as amended). Several key 
problems exist with the State's case in establishing the elements of 
the above two crimes. While evidence existed to support that a 
burglary occurred at the John home and that a theft of property from 
within the home occurred, insufficient evidence existed as to the 
identification of the perpetrator of those crimes. 
The critical issue in this case was indisputably one of 
identification. Even the prosecutor repeatedly conceded that the 
ultimate issue in the case was whether Mr. Quintana was the culprit 
(R. 118 at 20, R. 119 at 73). Despite that concession, the State 
was unable to produce a sufficient quantum of evidence to identify 
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Mr. Quintana as the individual who committed the burglary. Aside 
from no competent identification testimony, the State failed to 
connect Mr. Quintana with any of the Johns1 stolen property. 
The Johns left their home on early Friday morning and did 
not return until somewhere between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Sunday, 
September 27, 1987. While they found property missing from their 
home, the Johns themselves had no idea of the timing of the burglary 
and theft. The evidence admitted at trial on this issue consisted 
of testimonial evidence from neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Rains, who 
observed an individual on the porch of the John home late Sunday 
morning. Later, Mr. Rains spotted a person whom he believed to be 
the same individual in an alley behind the John home. No testimony 
was introduced that the individual spotted on the porch or in the 
alley was actually in the home of Mr. and Mrs. John nor that he was 
actually observed taking the property of the Johns. 
While it is true that Mr. Rains testified that the man he 
saw in the alley behind the John home appeared to be carrying 
something under his arm (R. 118 at 94), it is inconceivable that the 
bulge he described could have been the property taken from the John 
home inasmuch as a large vacuum and hose attachments and three 
good-sized stereo components would have created much more than a 
bulge.1 Moreover, it is important to note that the time which 
1 The actual size of the property missing from the John 
residence was described as follows: Amplifier, 14 x 6 x 10 inches, 
weighing 10 to 15 pounds; cassette player, 14 x 6 x 10 inches, 4 
pounds; the tuner, 14 x 3 x 10 inches, 2 pounds in weight; and the 
vacuum with accompanying hose attachments, approximately 3 to 4 feet 
high and 14 to 18 inches across, no testimony was given as to the 
weight of the vacuum cleaner (R. 118 at 31, 43-44). 
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elapsed from Mr. Rains observing the individual leave the porch of 
the John home until he spotted that vehicle near the alley behind 
the John home was mere minutes (R. 118 at 90) discounting the 
prosecutor's speculation of multiple trips or hiding the evidence 
(R. 119 at 102-03). 
The most critical evidence introduced at trial against 
Mr. Quintana was the testimony of Patricia Rains, who testified that 
as she arrived home, she observed a burgandy Mazda pickup truck and 
an individual standing on the porch of her neighbors1 home. She 
later testified that she recognized that individual to be Andrew 
Quintana (R. 118 at 61). This identification complete with the name 
was inherently unreliable and unsubstantiated by her own testimony. 
First, Mrs. Rains' physical description of the individual is 
inconsistent with Mr. Quintana himself. She described the 
individual as being five feet six inches tall and weighing bright 
and colorful bermuda shorts along with a tee shirt, the color of 
which she could not recall (R. 118 at 62). Mr. Quintana was 
measured by Thomas J. Wennergren, who testified that Mr. Quintana is 
5' 3-1/2" and, when wearing sneakers, 5f 4-3/4" tall (R. 119 t 49). 
Also, when stopped by police hours later, Mr. Quintana was not 
wearing colorful shorts but a solid grey pair (R. 119 at 9, 14). 
Moreover, his mother testified that he did not even own a pair of 
shorts such as those described by Mrs. Rains (R. 119 at 26). 
Second, contrary to her identifying Mr. Quintana by name, 
Mrs. Rains was unable to indicate how she knew Mr. Quintana, nor 
could she explain how she recognized him on the porch of the John 
- 19 -
home. She admitted she had never met Mr. Quintana (R. 118 at 61-62, 
69-70). Further, she claimed that, at the closest, she was thirty 
feet from the individual for mere seconds while she turned into the 
driveway and, after that, she was no closer than one hundred feet 
away from him (R. 118 at 72, 79), a distance quite lacking for 
identifying a person one had never actually met before. See 
Addendum E for transcript reflecting the lack of credible basis for 
recognizing Mr. Quintana. 
Third, and also critical is the lack of substantiation by 
police officers that Mrs. Rains actually identified the perpetrator 
as Mr. Quintana. She testified that when she notified police that a 
burglary had occurred, she gave the officers the license plate of 
the Mazda pickup truck, its description, and the name of Andy 
Quintana as the culprit (R. 118 at 65). However, police officers 
Ahearn and Robinson involved in the case were unable to corroborate 
that testimony inasmuch as neither officer had the information on 
reports or from dispatch that the suspect had been identified by 
name (R. 118 at 47; R. 119 at 5, 13). The dispatch indicated 
nothing more than the suspect vehicle being a Mazda pickup truck, 
maroon in color with trim and a damaged grill, and with a license 
plate reported as 5600AK. In direct disagreement with Mrs. Rains1 
testimony was the fact that Officer Robinson, when he pulled over 
the suspect vehicle, found Mr. Andrew Quintana as the driver and did 
not arrest him (R. 119 at 16). Had the name of the suspect been 
given to police, it is beyond question that the name would have been 
part of the dispatch and, that having been part of the 
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dispatch, that Mr. Quintana would have been arrested as the suspect 
in conjunction with the impound of the suspect vehicle. It follows 
that Mrs. Rains1 testimony is inconsistent with the evidence 
presented at trial and inherently unreliable. 
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized various 
evils inherent in eyewitness identification which requires rejecting 
as unreliable the testimony of Mrs. Rains. In State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483, 489-91 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
numerous problems, both potential and real, with the human memory 
process and with the ability of witnesses to accurately recall 
events. The Supreme Court pointed out that: 
(r)esearch has also undermined the common notion 
that the confidence with which an individual makes 
an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the 
accuracy of an identification is at times inversely 
related to the confidence with which it is made. 
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted). This recognition by the 
Supreme Court directly applies to the testimony of Mrs. Rains. The 
certainly of her identification of Mr. Quintana is contrary to the 
majority of the indicators analyzed by the Court in State v. Long. 
Moreover, it was late in the case when she "recalled" identifying 
Mr. Quintana by name on the day of the crimes. Therefore, not 
beyond consideration in this case is the possible explanation that 
Mrs. Rains1 late assertions at trial that she originally identified 
the perpetrator as Mr. Andy Quintana may be in direct response to 
the inability of her husband, Mr. Rains, to take the stand and offer 
identification testimony due to the suggestive nature of the 
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procedures police officers employed to obtain that testimony (see 
Point I, supra). 
Mrs. Rains' identification testimony, when checked 
against the Supreme Court's opinion recognizing the inherent 
problems in eyewitness testimony, is suspect and should have been 
discounted by the jury and, on review, must be discredited by this 
Court. As the Supreme Court found in State v. Long, empirical 
evidence documents the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with 
countless studies "all lead[ing] inexoribly to the conclusion that 
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited 
and fallable." Ij3. at 488. An additional observation by the Utah 
Supreme Court allows this Court to devalue the testimony of 
Mrs. Rains where the jurors did not. The Court indicated: 
[P]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not 
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony 
that they give such testimony great weight. In one 
notable study involving a simulated trial, 18% of 
the jurors voted to convict the defendant when 
there were no eyewitnesses to the crime. However, 
when a credible eyewitness was presented, 72% voted 
to convict. And, surprisingly, even when presented 
with an eyewitness who was quite thoroughly 
discredited by counsel, a full 68% still voted to 
convict. 
Id. at 490 (citations omitted). Understanding the suspect nature of 
Mrs. Rains' testimony and the inherent problems of eyewitness 
testimony, this Court must recognize that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Quitana was correctly 
identified as the perpetrator of the burglary and theft crimes of 
the Johns' home and property. 
Accordingly, the above factors illustrate that this Court 
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should recognize as a matter of law that the identification 
testimony of Mrs. Rains is unable and insufficient to sustain the 
convictions of Mr. Quintana. This Court should therefore reverse 
those convictions for insufficiency of the evidence and remand the 
case with an order to dismiss the charges against him. 
The additional piece of damaging evidence introduced 
against Mr. Quintana was the testimony regarding the patch cords 
found in the front of the Mazda pickup truck when stopped by Police 
Officer Robinson (R. 119 at 9). The prosecution offered those patch 
cords as Exhibit #1, implying them to be the actual patch cords 
taken from the home of Mr. John (R. 119 at 10). However, that 
assertion was incorrect as Mr. John was unable to identify the patch 
cords as his own (R. 118 at 33). See Point IIIA, infra. Not only 
was Mr. John not able to identify the patch cords as his own, 
Mr. Quintana introduced testimony which indicated those patch cords 
belonged to his brother, Jack, for use in the pickup truck and that 
they routinely remained in the pickup truck (R. 119 at 41, 45). The 
testimony of Jack was wholly corroborated by his mother (R. 119 at 
38) . 
Inasmuch as the patch cords were the only evidence which 
implicated Mr. Quintana and which could have established the 
requisite elements of the crime of Theft, thereby supporting the 
crime of Burglary, the State's case is insufficient as a matter of 
law. Again, this Court should therefore reverse the convictions of 
Mr. Quintana and remand to the trial court for a dismissal of the 
charges against him. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 19 TO THE JURY 
OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MR. QUINTANA. 
The trial court, over the objections of counsel, 
instructed the jury in this case as follows: 
Possession of recently stolen property, if 
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonably draw 
the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of 
the case, that the person in possession knew the 
property had been stolen. 
Thus if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 
in possession of stolen property, that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the theft, and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you 
find it justified by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with the 
offense of burglary (R. 82). 
Mr. Quintana objected to the instruction on two grounds: (1) No 
factual basis existed to support the conclusion that stolen property 
had been found in Mr. Quintana's possession, and (2) the instruction 
violated constitutional rights and inaccurately stated the law 
(R. 119 at 104-05). Mr. Quintana now urges that instruction No. 19 
not only was without factual basis but also violated his federal and 
state due process rights by effectively relieving the prosecution of 
its burden to prove each element of the offenses charged against him. 
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A. NO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTED FOR THE INSTRUCTION. 
The State alleged that Mr. Quintana was responsible for 
the burglary of the John home and the theft of three stereo 
components and accompanying "patch cords" as well as a vacuum 
cleaner and hose attachments (R. 118 at 31-32). While evidence was 
introduced at trial that these items were missing from the John 
home, no evidence suggested that Mr. Quintana was at any point in 
possession of the property. 
The closest allegation of possession of stolen property 
was presented through Exhibit #1, patch cords found in the truck of 
Mr. Quintana's brother, Jack (R. 118 at 31-32). However, those 
patch cords were never identified as the missing patch cords and 
were actually owned by Mr. Quintana's brother, Jack (R. 118 at 33; 
R. 119 at 41) . 
Mr. Ted John was shown the patch cords marked as 
Exhibit #1. The following colloquy took place: 
Q Let me show you—let me show you what 
has been marked here as Exhibit No. 1. Do you 
recognize these at all? 
A These look like the patch cords from 
the stereo. 
Q Would you describe those as being patch 
cords? 
A Yes. 
Q And would they be similar to the ones 
that you had in your stereo system? 
A Yes, very similar (R. 118 at 33). 
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On cross-examination, Mr. John further testified that the patch 
cords were the same that one would find on all stereo components 
(R. 118 at 41). He further agreed that while the patch cords 
indicated they were made in Japan, a good portion of stereo 
equipment is made there these days (R. 118 at 41). In short, 
Mr. John did not identify the patch cords as being his. 
Jack Quintana, Appellant's brother, testified that the 
Exhibit #1 patch cords which were taken from his truck belonged to 
him (R. 119 at 41) and that he routinely kept them in his truck to 
connect his portable amplifier, which he would alternate between his 
home and the truck (R. 119 at 41). His amplifier was introduced 
into evidence to support the testimony (R. 99; R. 119 at 41). 
Mrs. Beulah Gonzales, Mr. Quintanafs mother, corroborated the 
testimony of Jack, indicating she had seen the amplifier in the 
house and in the truck and that a corresponding set of patch cords 
were at home for the amplifier's use in the house (R. 119 at 38). 
Accordingly, the State did not establish that the patch 
cords were stolen; the only testimony regarding ownership was 
introduced by Jack Quintana and his mother. That testimony was 
unrebutted. As no stolen property was found in Mr. Andrew 
Quintana's possession, the instruction was without basis and should 
not have been given to the jury. The fact that the instruction was 
given without a factual basis cannot be construed as anything less 
than a baseless implication that stolen property was found on 
Mr. Quintana and should be considered in establishing his guilt of 
the crimes charged against him. As this Court recognized in 
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State v, Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988), instructions must 
be based on the evidence. This Court reaffirmed that maxim in 
Howland, stating: 
It seems almost axiomatic that instructions must 
bear a relationship to evidence reflected in the 
record, and we cannot enjoy the luxury of 
sustaining a conviction on trite aphorism 
unsupported by any kind of evidence, ^ 
Id. at 580 (quoting State v. Pacheco, 495 P.2d 808, 808 (1972)). 
This Court found the offending instruction in Howland to be 
reversible error. 1^. at 581. As Instruction No. 19 also offends 
this principle, Mr. Quintana was likewise prejudiced when the court 
gave the baseless instruction, and a new trial should be granted 
wherein such error does not reoccur. 
In the event this Court believes a factual basis existed 
to support the giving of the instruction, the instruction misapplied 
the law and violated Mr. Quintana's federal and state due process 
rights. 
B. THE INSTRUCTION VIOLATED FEDERAL AND STATE DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Instruction No. 19 required that Mr. Quintana offer a 
satisfactory explanation for the possession of stolen property or 
otherwise suffer the inferences that he knew the property was 
stolen, that he stole it, and that he burglarized in order to steal 
it. Such possible presumptions have no place in the law and 
impermissibly absolve the State from the obligation of proving each 
element of burglary and theft as constitutionally required. 
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Both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have examined 
this question involving an instruction using similar language. In 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1986); and State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Courts have held that the 
following instruction violated due process: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is 
made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that 
the person in possession stole the property. 
In each case, the Court found that this mandatory rebuttable 
presumption directly relates to the issue of guilt and relieves the 
State of its burden of proof. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327; 
State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 194; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045. 
The opinions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
relied on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), wherein the United States Supreme 
Court reminded that the due process clause requires "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt oE every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime . . . charged" (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
The Sandstrom Court stated the appropriate standard as "whether the 
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of 
the burden of proof enunciated in Winship," reasoning that if the 
jury could interpret the instruction as an irrebutable presumption 
or as requiring a high level of proof which effectively shifts the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant, it cannot pass constitutional 
muster. 422 U.S. at 517. 
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Admittedly, the instruction at issue in Chambers, 
Pacheco, and Turner contains mandatory language whereas Instruction 
No. 19 in this case used more permissive terms. (See Instruction 
No. 19, supra, or at Addendum F). That distinction, however, is of 
no significance to the outcome of this issue when applied to this 
case. In all three Utah cases relied on herein, the Courts have 
ruled that the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) 
(1953 as amended), which spawned this instruction, is not to be used 
in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases. Chambers, 709 
P.2d at 327; Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 194; Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045. 
The form used in Instruction No. 19 permitted Mr. Quintana's jury to 
reduce if not absolve the State of its burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of the offenses and shifted that 
burden, requiring Mr. Quintana to produce satisfactory explanations 
of his alleged possession of the property. 
In State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the question raised here in the context of a 
similar instruction without a mandatory presumption. The Court 
found no error where the instruction only allowed an inference of 
guilt and only if justified from the facts. .id. at 1234. However 
State v. Smith is distinguishable from the case at bar because the 
Smith Court reached that decision relying on several other 
instructions which accompanied the challenged instruction and 
clarified and reiterated that the inference was permissible only if 
supported by the facts. Further, still other instructions informed 
and cautioned jurors that mere possession of stolen property in and 
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of itself is not sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty. J[d. at 
1235 & 1235 n.l. The Court found these accompanying instructions 
prevented the jurors from applying the challenged instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner. JEd. at 1235. 
The jury in Mr. Quintanafs case did not receive the 
benefit of such rehabilitating companion instructions and did likely 
utilize Instruction No. 19 in an unconstitutionally impermissible 
manner. Moreover, the Smith Court completed its discussion of this 
issue "emphatically" declaring that Smith was not to be construed as 
a retreat from Chambers and that the trial court "should not have 
used" the language from Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) for the same 
reasons stated in Chambers. Id. at 1235-36. Therefore, Smith is 
inapposite to the determination to be made in this case. 
Mr. Quintana's case is more closely alligned with the 
opinion in State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1046, wherein this Court 
found that the shift in burden occurring in that case was reversible 
error in light of the "slim evidentiary basis" for the conviction. 
The case against Mr. Quintana is at least as questionable, as 
Mr. Turner possessed stolen property and Mr. Quintana arguably did 
not (see subpoint A of this point, supra) and because the State in 
both cases did not produce any evidence that the accused stole 
anything and relied on minimal pieces of circumstantial evidence to 
support the cases. Compare State v. Turner, 736 P.2d at 1046, with 
Point II of this brief, supra. 
Although the Utah tripartite of cases cited herein, 
Chambers, Pacheco and Turner, ostensibly relied on the federal due 
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process protections afforded through the fourteenth amendment, 
Mr. Quintana insists that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution also supports his position and requires reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial, Mr. Quintana urges that Utah's due 
process protection affords him at least the equivalent of the 
federal safeguards discussed above and may surpass the federal 
protection. See State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1986); and "Recent Developments in Utah Law," 1987 Utah Law Review 
79. See also State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (due 
process of state constitution protects against the refiling of 
criminal charges absent a showing of new or additional evidence or 
other good cause), and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 
(state due process may be violated without a cautionary instruction 
revealing the unreliability of eyewitness testimony whenever 
eyewitness testimony is at issue and the instruction is requested by 
the defense) . 
In the present case, the jurors were allowed to relieve 
the State of its burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt and were allowed to shift that burden to 
Mr. Quintana to satisfactorily explain the circumstances. The 
instruction permitting that opportunity violated federal and/or 
state constitutional due process strictures and cannot be 
tolerated. Mr. Quintana must have the ability to remain silent if 
he so chooses, as he did in this case, and to require the State to 
prove its case against him. See State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 
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1045 (Utah App, 1987) (Instruction No. 19 could have been viewed by 
the jury as an unfavorable comment on his silence and exercise of 
his constitutional right to a jury trial). As that burden was 
removed from the State in this case, Mr. Quintana's convictions must 
be reversed an3 the case remanded for a new trial absent such error. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and 
remand this case to the District Court with an order to dismiss the 
charges or hol<3 a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^g^ day of March, 1989. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




ANDREW R. QUINTANA, : Case No. CR87-1424 
Judge RAYMOND S. UNO 
Defendant : 
The defendant above named by and through his attorney, 
LYNN R. BROWN, hereby moves the court for an order suppressing 
the identification of the defendant, ANDREW R. QUINTANA, by 
Dean Rains, a witness in the case. 
The basis for this motion is that a witness in the 
case, Mr. Dean Rains, was told by the police that they had a 
suspect who they thought might be involved in the burglary. 
The defendant, Mr. Quintana, was then identified while at the 
police station by having him walk past a desk where the 
witness, Mr. Rains, was sitting. 
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
The identification of the defendant, Mr. Andrew 
Quintana, in the manner described above was made contrary to 
acceptable standards of due process in that such identification 
procedure was suggestive and proper identification procedures 
were not followed. 
DATED this f { day of March, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Cfr~* X< \ ^ 4r~ 
EYflN R. BROWN 
Ktt orney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on 
t h e
 1/ day of *rn^ <r/i / 1988, at the hour of <L fi .m 
before the Honorable RAYMOND S. UNO, Third District Court 
Judge. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this // day of March, 1988. 
• / 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion and Notice of 
Hearing to the Salt Lake County Attorney1s Office, 231 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of 
March, 1988. 
A: No I was not. 
Q: So the first time that you had occasion to identify any body is 
in court here today, is that correct? 
A: No, they, the police department had me come in and they had him 
in an office and asked me to identify him. 
Q: Where was this at? 
A: At the police department on the eight floor. 
Q: They took you into the police department and showed you him 
sitting in an office. 
A: No, they just had him walk by me as I sat at a desk. 
Q: How close did he walk by you? 
A: Ifd say about four feet. 
Q: What did they tell you, that they had a person that they thought 
might be involved* in the burglary and that they want you to take a 
look at him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And so they brought you down to the police station. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And had him walk by you. 
A: Exactly. 
Q: Did anyone else walk by you? 
A: Just another officer at the time. 
Q: They didnft have any other suspects to walk by you though to 
take a look at then, is that true? 
A: No. 
Q: Just one individual? 
A: Yes. 
- 18 -
Q: And that's the individual seated at counsel table here. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the same individual that walked by you then is seated here, 
is that true? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So then you told them at that time that that was the individual 
that was involved in what you saw on that particular day? 
A? Yes. 
Q: Was there any difference in the way he looked then and the way 
he looked on that particular day? 
A: Then being when I was there at the police department? 
Q: Yes. 
A: Uh, other then the cloths, no. 
Q: So at the police station and today is the only time you've had 
to making identification, is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Now when the individual went to the front porch, he was only 
there a matter of a few seconds, is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And he didn't open the door, is that true? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you see him attempt to open any door? 
A: Oh, actually no, it looked more like he might have rang the door 
bell is what it looked like he was doing. 
Q: • 
A: I couldn't exactly tell, his back was to me at the time. 
Q: Did he go to any of the windows? 
- 19 -
ADDENDUM B 
LYNN R. BROWN (#0460) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
.APR 2 5 1988 
/ H> 0^09 MmdltyC Cterlc 3r<S Ofst. Coprt 
I \Oeputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ANDREW R. QUINTANA, 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. CR87-1424 
Judge RAYMOND S. UNO 
On motion of the defendant and good cause appearing it 
is hereby ordered that the motion to suppress witness 
identification is granted. 
The Court finds that the identification procedure used 
in this case was suggestive and the State is prohibited from 
using the testimony of Mr. Dean Rains at any subsequent 
proceedings to identify Mr. Andrew Quintana. 
DATED this ^ T ^ d a y of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
0 
JUDGE RAYMOND S . UNO 
Third D i s t r i c t rt^ptxrtcy;-
/-X I f D :X£H ; I . <~V£Y 
ADDENDUM C 
direct examination, State will cross-examine. After they 
have rested, the State may have some rebuttal witnesses, and 
the defense may have some surrebuttal witnesses. 
After both sides have rested, then the Court will 
read the instructions to you. After the instructions are 
read, then they both have an opportunity to make a closing 
statement to you. Since the State has the burden of proof, 
they will make the first opening statement. Then the de-
fense will have only one opportunity to address you. And 
they will have to anticipate what the State will say on 
rebuttal—after they have finished their closing statement, 
I should say, then the State will have an opportunity to 
make the final rebuttal closing statement. 
Then the matter will be submitted to you to 
deliberate on. I should advise you that if you wish to, you 
may take notes on this particular case. And when you take 
notes, do not share those notes with anyone else until you 
get into the jury room. And keep those notes confidential 
all during the course of the trial until you go out to 
deliberate. Okay. You may proceed. 
MR. JONES: Members of the jury, at the beginning 
of every trial, the Court always allows each party, both the 
prosecution and defense a chance to make what is called an 
opening statement. 
As Judge Uno told you, the comments of attorneys 
13 
[OPENING STATEMENT OF PROSECUTOR] 
1 during an opening statement, of course, are not evidence. 
2 Evidence comes from the witnesses who are called to testify, 
3 or it may come in the form of any exhibits that are received 
4
 in evidence. 
5 And the purpose of an opening statement is simply 
6 to give you an idea of what this case is all about, and to 
7 explain to you what we anticipate the testimony will be. As 
8 you know, this is a case involving burglary and theft. That 
9 is someone breaking into someone else's home and taking 
10 property that doesn't belong to them. This particular case 
11 happened just over a year ago or just under a year a g o — 
12 excuse m e — i n September of 1987. And we will be offering 
13 this diagram of the area that's in question. 
14 The diagram essentially involves what is called 
15 Emery Street and Illinois Avenue here. What you have is a 
16 man named Ted John and his wife were living in this home at 
17 1162 Emery Street. They had left on, I think it was, Friday 
18 morning the 25th of September, and had been gone for a 
19 couple of days. And of course when they left, they locked 
20 up the home. Nothing was missing, nothing had been taken. 
2i When they came back on Sunday afternoon, sometime between 
22 I 4:00 and 6:00, they noticed there was a notice on the door, 
essentially saying that the police had been there. 
And about the same time, one of the neighbors came 
23 
24 
25 I over and in essence told Mr. John that, hey, somebody has 
14 
1 broken into your house. 
2 Well, Mr. John, of course, started to do an inven-
3 tory inside the home. And essentially what he discovered 
4
 missing was his stereo system. There was an amplifier, a 
5 tuner and cassette player. All of these items were valued 
6 at, oh, somewhere between seven and $900. In addition they 
7 discovered that of all things a vacuum cleaner had been 
8 taken in this burglary. 
9 Mr. John discovered that someone had removed one 
10 of the screens on the window in the kitchen, and concluded 
11 that that was probably the point of entry. 
12 The police had already been there, had already 
13 dusted the house for fingerprints, and had left. He, of 
14 course, contacted the police and gave them some information. 
15 One of the things that the investigators dis-
16 covered in working on the case—the police department—was 
17 that across the street from Ted's house—they live at 1162, 
18 and it is here 1173—that is a duplex—a young couple named 
19 Dean and Patricia Rains lived. And the officer talked to 
20 Dean and Patricia, and Mr. and Mrs. Rains said that on 
21 Sunday morning at about eleven, 11:30, right in this area, 
22 that they had observed a man coming down the street and 
23 coming up on the porch here at the home that belonged to Ted 
24 John. 
25 I Mrs. Rains told the officers that she knew who 
15 
1 that man was. It was this defendant, Andrew Quintana. She 
2 said that he went up on the porch for a fev; minutes. Ke 
3 appeared to be looking through the windows. Then he went 
4
 over by the* door, spent a couple of minutes at the door, 
5 then he came down off the porch. 
6 Well, Mr. and Mrs. Rains watched the defendant. 
7 He came down off the porch and he came back up to the 
8 corner. Near the corner of Emery and Illinois, he had 
9 parked there a small 1983 Mazda pickup. And they said that 
10 he got into the pickup and then he backed across the street, 
11 through the intersection of Illinois and Emery, made a 
12 right-hand turn, which would be sending him westbound, and 
13 parked the car down in this vicinity. Down at the end of 
14 the diagram. 
15 Mr. Rains, of course, was curious to know what he 
16 was doing. He said there was something just not right, and 
17 so what happened is Mr. Rains got into his vehicle and drove 
18 up to the corner and came this same way, westbound along 
19 Illinois. Ke said that he noticed the pickup parked approx-
20 imately here. 
21 Now, this area on the diagram is an alleyway. It 
22 is not a very biq alley. He couldn't drive a car or truck 
23 down it. There was a lot of weeds and debris and everything 
24 in the alleyway. 
25 Mr. Rains came down, made a U-turn and parked on 
16 
1 the other side of the Illinois Street, right next to that 
2 alley. And he said that the defendant was out of sight. He 
3 didn't know exactly where the defendant had gone, but 
4
 essentially he said he saw him come out. 
5 MR. BROWN: Excuse me. I object to that argument, 
6 Your Honor. May we approach the bench? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 (Conference at the bench.) 
9 I MR. BROWN: Thank you. 
10 MR. JONES: By the way, Mr. Rains, as I mentioned, 
11 is sitting here in his vehicle, and he sees this man come 
12 out in the area here on the diagram, which is almost adja-
13 cent to where Ted John lives. And he said that when the man 
14 came out, he appeared to be wearing some kind of a baggy 
15 shirt, something like a large T-shirt. Appeared there was 
16 something up underneath that T-shirt. He said that initial-
17 ly when he saw the suspect, he kind of hesitated for a 
18 minute, almost as if he was going to turn and go the other 
19 way. Then he turned around and came back down the alleyway. 
20 He walked right in front of Mr. Rains and went 
2i over and got into something inside that 1983 Mazda pickup 
22 I and took off. 
Well, Mr. Rains went back to his wife, told her to 
24 I call the police, and then he went over to Ted John's house 
25 I and discovered that the back door was opened and v/ent in and 
17 
23 
1 appeared someone had been in there, inside the house. He 
2 waited and the police eventually arrived. 
3 One of the things that Mr. Rains was able to do 
4 was to jot down a license plate number for this 1983 pickup 
5 truck. He wrote that down and gave that information to the 
6 police department. 
7 Later that same afternoon, about 3:00, there was 
8 an Officer Robinson who was on duty, and had received some 
9 of the information concerning this burglary, which had been 
10 reported about 11:30 or 12:00. Officer Robinson observed a 
11 vehicle matching the description of the one which had been 
12 reported, a maroon 1983 Mazda pickup. 
13 He stopped the vehicle. The person who was 
14 driving the vehicle was Andrew Quintana. There was no one 
15 else in the vehicle. 
16 He conducted a search and found nothing in the 
17 vehicle as far as the property which had been reported 
18 missing. 
19 Members of the jury, that in essence is the case. 
20 The property was not recovered. It never has been re-
21 covered. But I submit to you that the evidence you have in 
22 this case tells you that there is only one person who is 
23 actually resoonsible for the break-in, the burglary, the 
24 theft of the property, and that is this defendant, Andrew 
25 Quintana. 
18 
1 Thank you. 
2 MR. BROWN: Before I give my statement, Your 
3 Honor, I think we should deal with what we talked about on 
4
 the side bar. 
5 THE COURT: All right. If we can just have the 
6 jury step out one moment. There is a motion that defense 
7 wishes to make at this time. 
8 (Jury outside the courtroom.) 
9 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to 
10 our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that 
11 I could make a motion at this time and have the same force 
12 and effect as if it had been made when we approached the 
13 bench; is that correct? 
14 THE COURT: Yes. 
15 MR. BROWN: And the reason I ask to approach the 
16 bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in hi 
17 opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains 
18 saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant 
19 coming out of the alley. Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the 
20 defendant. Now, that's critical because the Court, on a 
21 prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness 
22 identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that 
23 Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant. 
24 Can't make an eyewitness identification of the defendant. 




MR. BROWN: Before I give my statement, Your 
Honor, I think we should deal with what we talked about on 
the side bar. 
THE COURT: All right. If we can just have the 
jury step out one moment. There is a motion that defense 
wishes to make at this time. 
(Jury outside the courtroom.) 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, at this time, pursuant to 
our conversation at the side bar, the Court indicated that 
I could make a motion at this time and have the same force 
and effect as if it had been made when we approached the 
bench; is that correct? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BROWN: And the reason I ask to approach the 
bench at that time, Your Honor, is because Mr. Jones, in his 
opening statement, indicated—told the jury that Mr. Rains 
saw the defendant when he made reference to the defendant 
coming out of the alley. Ke said that Mr. Rains saw the 
defendant. Now, that's critical because the Court, on a 
prior motion of the defendant, has suppressed the witness 
identification of Mr. Rains, and has signed an order that 
Mr. Rains cannot make any identification of the defendant. 
Can't make an eyewitness identification of the defendant. 
Mr. Jones's statement to the jury certainly, 
19 
fMTSTRTAL MOTTONl 
1 although it is not the testimony of Mr. Rains at this time, 
2 he hasn't testified yet, but he has told the jury that Mr. 
3 Rains saw the defendant coming out of the alleyway. There 
4
 is no two ways about it. Planted in the minds of the jury 
5 right now that Mr. Rains saw the defendant. And I would 
6 move for a mistrial on that basis. 
7 MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, I think the Court is 
8 clearly aware first of all the proposition that what is said 
9 in the opening statement is not evidence, and the jury, I 
10 think, clearly understands all we are doing is outlining the 
11 case in what we anticipate the evidence to be. 
12 The next question becomes is whether this comment 
13 is so prejudicial that somehow it warrants justifying a mis-
14 trial. I just, by any stretch of the imagination, I don't 
15 see how the comments to the jury about what we anticipate 
16 the testimony will be, even in light of the Court's ruling 
17 that we not make a positive identification, has so tainted 
18 or prejudiced the case that it justifies starting over, or 
19 at least granting some kind of mistrial. 
20 Clearly the evidence is going to come out that Mr. 
21 Rains followed somebody, and that there was somebody on the 
22 front porch. The ultimate issue in this case is, of course, 
23 whether or not that was the defendant. And I just don't see 
24 that the comments or statements made in the opening state-
25 ment constitute mistrial. 
I 20 
1 MR. BROUN: When the question is identification, 
2 how prejudiced can a defendant get when Mr. Jones tells the 
3 jury that Mr. Rains saw the defendant. I can't say it any 
4
 more bluntly than that. The question is identification. 
5 1 Mr. Quintana says he wasn't there. They saw some-
6 body. There was definitely—we are going to have a problem 
7 with this all the way through. I would ask the Court to 
8 J grant a mistrial. We will start this thing up again first 
9 thing in the morning. But I don't know how much more pre-
10 judiced a defendant can get by the prosecutor telling the 
11 jury that Mr. Rains saw the defendant. There is only one 
12 defendant in here, and that is Mr. Quintana. He is seated 
13 right here. I renew my motion. 
14 THE COURT: Based on what has been argued, the 
15 Court is going to deny the motion. Court will either make a 
16 curative instruction, but I believe the Court has already 
17 told the jurors that the only evidence that they are to con-
18 1 sider is the evidence that's heard from the witness stand. 
19 So as the evidence comes out in arguments that are made, you 
20 will have to—that will have to be tied in, and I don't 
21 think it can be tied in as far as the evidence is concerned. 
22 So the motion will be denied. 
23 (Jury returns to the courtroom.) 
24 MR. BROWN: May I proceed, Your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: You may do so. 
21 
ADDENDUM E 
1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 Q (By Mr. Jones) Can you give the jury an idea of 
3 how far it is from your driveway across to Ted John's house? 
4 A Maybe a hundred feet away. 
5 Q And is there anything at all that blocks your view 
6 or your vision from where you stood, as you unloaded the 
7 car, to the Ted John's home? 
8 I A No. 
9 Q You said that the man you saw is who? 
10 A Andy Quintana. 
it Q And do you recognize him here in court? 
12 A I do. 
13 Q Just for the record, what is he wearing today? 
14 A What is he wearing today? 
15 Q How is he dressed? 
16 A He is wearing a sweater and gray jeans. 
17 Q And where is he seated? 
18 A Right there in the front at this table. 
19 MR. JONES: Your Honor, may the record reflect 
20 identification of the defendant? 
21 THE COURT: Yes, it may do so. 
22 0 (By Mr. Jones) Mrs. Rains, do vou_Jcngw__ths__cl&fanr 
23 d a n ^ 
24 A I don't know the defendant. I know of him. 
25 Q Have you seen him before? 
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Did you recognize 
front of the house? 
him on that day when you saw him] 
A I did, 
Q Do you recall how he was dressed that day? 
A He had on a T-shirt. I couldn't swear to the 
color of the shirt, and Bermuda shorts. 
Q Now, when you say Bermuda shorts, can you describe 
those for me; what they look like? 
A Just all colors. I remember bright and colorful 
and just above the knee. 










What did you do, then, after you saw him on the 
you unloaded the groceries? 
I just went straight into the house. 
And did you see him again after you went into the 
Yeah, because I walked over to the window, because 




he was looking at. 
Okay. 
And then I seen him walk off of the porch and over 
to his truck. 
6 2 
-- - - J 
1 correct? 
2 A Uh-huh. 
3 Q And no one was in the pickup when you first saw 
4
 the pickup? 
5 A No one was in it. 
6 Q And you first saw an individual on the neighbors' 
7 porch across the street when you pulled into your driveway? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 Q Is that correct? 
10 A No, I seen it when I turned the corner. As I 
11 turned the corner, I seen the truck and I glanced up and he 
12 was on the porch. 
13 Q Were you paying any particular attention to it at 
14 that point; is that true? 
15 A (No response.) 
16 Q Was there any reason that you were paying any 
17 attention to it at that point? 
18 A I was paying attention more to the person than the 
19 vehicle because I recognized him. 
20 Q Vlhen you first saw the person/ did you say to 
21 yourself, well, thatfs Andrew Quintana? 
22 A I did. 
23 Q You said that to yourself? 
24 A Yeah. I said, "That's Andy," and I thought he was 
25 stranded. 
rnpncq-FYAMTNATTON OF MRS. RAINS] 
1 I Q You never met Andy? 
2 I A I have never met him. I don't personally know-
3 I know of him. 
4
 Q Let me just ask you the questions. You can re-
5 spond to them. When was the last timef prior to that, that 
6 you had seen the person that you thought was Andy Quintana? 
7 J A^ Oh, maybe a few days ago, because I drive up and 
8 
9 I Q Two or three days ago? 
10 A Two or three days ago. 
11 Q Where was this place that you thought you saw Andy 




16 a l o t . 
17 Q 
18 A 
19 t o work, 





















20 Q Were you just passing him on the street?, 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q But never met him? 
OHB» • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • f e 
23 A T n e v e r me t h i m . I j u s t know o f h i m . 
«MBfc € • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 € • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • * 
24 Q Did someone else give you his name? 
25 A No. 
69 
Q No one gave you his name, but you knew his name 
was Andy Quintana? 
^ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ^ 
A Because I know of him. 
Q Who gave you his name? Do you know somebody? 
A (No response.) 
Q Your answer is no? 
A No. 
Q Have you been to his house? 
A JJever. 
Q Has he been to your house? 
A I think he has with maybe my sister. 
Q Do you know for sure that he has been to your 
A No. 
Q Now, when you parked in your driveway—now, your 
driveway—could you designate that on the chart? 
A My driveway? 
Q Where your driveway is. 
A My driveway is right here. 
Q And that would be on the north side of the house? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And while you were getting out of the car with 
your groceries, you looked across the street and you sav/ 




INSTRUCTION NO. / * ? 
Possession of recently stolen property, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence of the case, 
that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen. 
Thus if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession of stolen 
property, that such possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the theft, and the defendant made no satisfactory explanation 
of such possession, then you may infer from those facts that the 
defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find it justified 
by the evidence, to connect the possessor of recently stolen 
property with the offense of burglary. 
0'}(K 
